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NOTE
Loss CAUSATION AND CLASS CERTIFICATION
Steven Serajeddini*
Courts have long faced difficulty interpreting loss causation under
Section lOb-5 of the Securities Act of 1934. This difficulty stems
from the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between this core ele-
ment of common law fraud and the procedural demands of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the typical vehicle for a
10b-5 class action. Recently, some courts and commentators have
begun to consider loss causation as an individualized inquiry that is
not common among class members, and one that therefore warrants
consideration at the class certification stage. The existing justifica-
tions center on the conceptually distinct 10b-5 element of reliance,
an unsuitable basis for considering loss causation at class certifica-
tion. This Note provides an alternative justification for
consideration of loss causation at class certification: the class defi-
nition. It demonstrates that to define the start and end date of the
class purchasers or sellers with the requisite certainty demanded by
Rule 23 and sound policy, courts must have an understanding of the
nature of loss. This can be achieved only through an examination of
loss causation at the class certification stage.
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INTRODUCTION
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the catchall provision of the Securities
Act of 1934,2 serves as a bulwark against knowing misrepresentations by
securities issuers by providing shareholders a private cause of action.3 Indi-
viduals, however, are likely to find it prohibitively costly to initiate suits
under this provision. Enter the class action, which multiplies the damages
over a mass of shareholders, eliciting substantial settlements from risk-
averse corporations and officers. The tenuous connection to the merits4 and
the considerable legal fees characteristic of these suits have engendered the
longstanding perception that securities class actions are prone to abuse.5
Not surprisingly, class certification-where a court examines the propri-
ety of the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the typical vehicle for a lOb-5 claim-is a watershed in securities fraud
class actions.6 Failure at this stage usually means plaintiffs will drop the
claim,' while success leverages the threat of a potentially devastating judg-
ment to impel defendants to settle!s As a result, securities-fraud class actions
rarely reach trial.9 Therefore, the need for certainty at the class certification
1. Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person to "make any untrue statement [or omis-
sion] of a material fact ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2007).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
3. The Court first recognized this implied remedy in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bank-
ers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), later acknowledging that it had become "a judicial oak
which [grew] from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
4. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During The First Decade After The PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2006).
5. See Karen Donovan, Class-Action Cases Rise, Fueled by Subprime Troubles, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, at C7 ("Class-action filings, excluding subprime cases and those stemming from the
backdating of stock options, have increased almost 40 percent from 2006. Average settlements have
also jumped, to $33.2 million from $22.7 million.").
6. 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECU-
RITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7:469, at 7-911 (2d ed. 2008).
7. Id.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendments; BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 6. Even a small diminution in stock price spread over a mass of sharehold-
ers can result in an enormous judgment against a defendant.
9. In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 E3d 1, 17 n.20 (1st Cir. 2005).
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stage is immense. These stakes are an important counterpoise to the dogma
that certification should not turn on the merits of a claim.
0
To attain class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) a plaintiff must establish
six requirements: numerosity of plaintiffs, typicality of the lead plaintiff's
claim, commonality of the lead plaintiff's claim, adequacy of lead plaintiff's
representation, predominance of common claims, and superiority of a class
action as a method of adjudication." Before granting certification, the court
must be satisfied by a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff has met
each requirement.12 The most important class criterion in the context of se-
curities fraud is predominance, which requires that "common issues ...
predominate over any individual issues."'3
Securities-fraud claims under lOb-5 generally satisfy the predominance
requirement of 23(b)(3) with one exception: reliance. The majority of the
lOb-5 elements 4 focus on the behavior of the defendant, rendering the is-
sues common across all plaintiffs. For instance, the "purchase or sale of the
security" and loss causation requirements are common to the class.'5 Reli-
ance, however, requires the plaintiff to prove that she bought or sold a
security in response to the misrepresentation. 6 Requiring this proof at the
individual level would violate the predominance requirement,' 7 presenting a
roadblock to class certification.
10. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (reasoning that merits adjudica-
tion is best addressed under the "traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials" and not in
the "absence of established safeguards").
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
12. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); Teamsters
Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2008).
13. See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.462, at 7-898.54.
14. Courts, following the lead of common law fraud, have distilled lOb-5 into six elements: a
material misrepresentation (or omission), scienter, a connection with the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
341-42 (2005).
15. Loss causation asks whether the diminution in value can be attributed to the misrepresen-
tation and subsequent corrective disclosure. 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.11[3], at 160-61 (6th ed. 2009). In its simplest sense, this can be
answered with respect to all stockholders with the same methodology.
16. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7:441, at 7-898.5.
17. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). Thus, the court must ask "whether the
element of reliance raises a common issue, and assuming that it does not whether the common is-
sues still predominate." Kom v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972). Before Basic,
courts often incorrectly classified reliance as a question of damages to be determined individually
following resolution of the merits of the class, or even eliminated it as an element altogether, to
avert conflict with the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Comment, The Impact of Class
Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 345-46 (1971). The typical response of courts was
to have each shareholder sign an affidavit attesting their reliance, which the court would then have
the discretion to accept. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 461 (2006). This would be a costly and potentially perjurious
exercise for plaintiffs. Courts went to such lengths because the alternative would have been to dis-




The fraud-on-the-market presumption, most famously articulated in Ba-
sic v. Levinson, is a means of circumventing this individualized requirement
for reliance. "8 A plaintiff can invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption by
proving that (1) the defendant made public material misrepresentations re-
garding the stock, (2) the shares were traded on an efficient market, and (3)
the plaintiff traded the shares between the time of the misrepresentation and
the time the truth emerged.' 9 By purchasing or selling stock, an investor
automatically relies on the integrity of the market and therefore indirectly
relies on any fraud perpetrated against the market. ° This transforms an indi-
vidual inquiry into a common one, satisfying the predominance
requirement.2 The defendant, however, can rebut (hereinafter "the rebuttal")
the presumption with "any showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or
his decision to trade at a fair market price. 2
Courts contemplate the fraud-on-the-market presumption at class certifi-
cation notwithstanding the proscription on merits adjudication at that stage.
The Supreme Court's holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin instructs
courts not to "conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits' '23 at class certi-
fication. But because the fraud-on-the-market presumption-whose
elements overlap substantially with the merits-makes reliance a common
inquiry, plaintiffs must prove it at class certification to establish predomi-
nance and satisfy Rule 23. Fortunately, this has coincided with the
liberalization of the Eisen rule, starting soon after with the Court's decision
24in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon. The circuits now nearly
uniformly allow an examination of the merits at the class certification stage
insofar as it is necessary to make findings for the purposes of Rule 23."
Starting with Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom,
26Inc., the Fifth Circuit has capitalized on liberalized merits consideration at
18. Fraud-on-the-market theory is "a practical resolution to the problem of balancing the
substantive requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of
[Rule] 23." Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted). Basic memorialized the theo-
rem, which had been around for some time prior. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
19. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
20. Id. at 247.
21. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005).
22. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
23. 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
24. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
25. E.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 E3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
class certification "require[s] definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their
overlap with merits issues"); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004).
Nonetheless, courts attempting to vitiate the rigor demanded by Rule 23 continue to invoke Eisen.
E.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 163, 169 (E.D. Pa. 2007), overruled by In
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009).
26. 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Oscar in Luskin v. Inter-
voice-Brite Inc., 261 F. App'x 697 (5th Cir. 2008).
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class certification and dramatically expanded plaintiffs' burden at this stage
by requiring them to show loss causation-the proximate cause element of
lOb-5-to establish the fraud-on-the-market presumption. The court justi-
fied the decision by casting loss causation as an ineluctable indicator of
market efficiency, one of the factual predicates of the Basic fraud-on-the-. 27
market presumption. Subsequent commentaries on Oscar have reached a
similar conclusion with respect to loss causation and class certification but
justified that conclusion on the grounds of the Basic predicate of materiality
or its rebuttal. 2' At the same time, Oscar spawned a wave of academic criti-
cism and split the circuits, leaving the Fifth Circuit alone in requiring
29plaintiffs to show loss causation at the class certification stage.
This Note uses this split as its point of departure and provides a new
basis for considering loss causation at the lOb-5 class certification stage. It
argues that plaintiffs must establish loss causation at the class certification
stage, not to prove reliance, but to properly define the class. Part I evaluates
the prevailing justifications-the fraud-on-the-market prerequisites of mate-
riality and efficiency, and the Basic rebuttal-for requiring plaintiffs to show
loss causation at the class certification stage. Part I concludes that loss cau-
sation is conceptually incongruous with reliance, and while loss
causation-type evidence may help adduce the predicates and rebuttal of the
fraud-on-the-market theory, the plaintiff does not bear the burden of raising
it. Part II then obviates the split created by Oscar by proffering the class
definition as an alternate justification for requiring the plaintiff to show loss
causation. The identification of a corrective disclosure, which marks the end
of the class period, requires proof of loss causation. The statutory require-
ments and sound policy dictate that courts must use loss causation to
accurately define lOb-5 classes at the class certification stage.
I. Loss CAUSATION UNDER THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY
Liberalized merits consideration at the certification stage and continuing
concerns over the irrelevance of merits in securities class actions have in-
creasingly spurred commentators to call for plaintiffs to show loss causation
27. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 268-70.
28. See infra notes 46, 74.
29. For examples of courts in other circuits that have rejected Oscar, see In re Nature's Sun-
shine Product's Inc. Securities Litigation, 251 F.R.D. 656, 665 (D. Utah 2008) ("[T]he Fifth
Circuit's decision in Oscar appears to be in conflict with Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit prece-
dent which warn against determining the merits at the class certification stage."); Lapin v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Oscar should be rejected as a misreading of
Basic."); and In re Micron Technologies, Inc., Securities Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 627, 634 (D. Idaho
2007) ("It is unlikely that [Oscar's standard] would be adopted in this Circuit because it misreads
Basic."). For examples of commentators, see Recent Case, Securities Litigation-Class Certifica-
tion-Fifth Circuit Holds That Plaintiffs Must Prove Loss Causation Before Being Certified As A
Class.-Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007),
121 HARV. L. REV. 890, 895 (2008); and Tad E. Thompson, Recent Development, Messin' with
Texas: How The Fifth Circuit's Decision in Oscar Private Equity Misinterprets The Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1086, 1100 (2008).
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at the class certification stage.3° In Oscar Private Equity v. Allegiance Tele-
com, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit became the first U.S. Court of Appeals to reach
this conclusion.32 This Part examines the element of loss causation and ex-
plains why the existing justifications for consideration of loss causation at
the class certification stage, based on the fraud-on-the-market theory, are
inapposite. Section L.A defines loss causation and differentiates it from the
related elements of reliance and economic loss. Section I.B demonstrates
that neither the elements nor the rebuttal of the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption requires the plaintiff to show loss causation at class certification.
A. Defining Loss Causation
Causation under lOb-5 requires both a misrepresentation and corrective
disclosure.33 Reliance, or but-for causation, centers on the misrepresenta-
tion.34 On the other hand, loss causation--or proximate causation-focuses
on the relationship between the misrepresentation and the subsequent cor-
rective disclosure.35 The term corrective disclosure refers to the event or
series of events that cured the misrepresentation. A corrective disclosure
does not necessarily have to identify the misrepresentation and refute it;
instead, it can be a series of partially corrective disclosures or some other
type of market dissemination of the correct information.36 To show loss cau-
sation, the plaintiff must prove first that the disclosures she alleges were in
30. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking "Efficient Markets" Out of the Fraud-on-
the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 995
(2003).
31. 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
32. Id. at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
33. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005); see also Glaser v. Enzo
Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) ("It is only after the fraudulent conduct is dis-
closed to the investing public, followed by a drop in value of the stock, that the ... investor has
suffered a "loss" that is actionable after the Supreme Court's decision in Dura.").
34. Transaction causation and reliance diverge in certain contexts-for example, in cases
concerning proxy statements, where proof of reliance is not always necessary to show transaction
causation, or in the case of omissions. 2 FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, ANNOTATED
§ 1489, at 43:222 (1997); see Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972). However, for the purposes of 1Ob-5, transaction causation has long been equated to reliance.
See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341-42. Prior to the PSLRA, some lower courts adopted a much more strin-
gent measure of transaction causation that required more to prove reliance than mere but-for
causation, see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983); however, these courts
were unwittingly treating causation as a whole.
35. See Devonbrook, Inc. v. Lily Lynn, Inc., No. 70 Civ. 4687, 1974 WL 419, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1974). Professor Donald Langevoort characterizes the elements as follows:
"[F]irst, the showing that the market was distorted by the fraud; second, that the emergence of the
truth, corrective disclosure, caused a loss to some or all investors. The former, as just noted, is what
Basic focused on as a predicate for the presumption of reliance. The latter, loss causation, is concep-
tually separate." Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market 29
(Georgetown Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 1026316, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/
abstractlD= 1026316.
36. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F3d 221, 230 (5th Cir. 2009); In re
Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F Supp. 2d 501, 542 (N.D. 111. 2007).
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fact corrective." The plaintiff can then show that she suffered a loss as a
result of the misrepresentation by selling after the corrective disclosure. On
the other hand, if a purchaser sells her shares before the corrective disclo-
sure, she suffers no economic loss, and hence there is no loss causation."
B. The Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption and Loss Causation
The Basic fraud-on-the-market presumption is a substitute for a tradi-
tional reliance showing and ameliorates the prohibitive proof difficulties that
would otherwise result under Rule 23. It dispenses with the problematic
subjective mental-state analysis of reliance and leaves an objective market
standard39 founded on the premises of market efficiency and integrity.4° Un-
like a face-to-face transaction, where parties can bargain over price, in a
market transaction the market performs the valuation.4 ' The efficient market
serves as the "unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price., 42 The individual implicitly relies on the market, which under efficient
capital markets hypothesis in its semistrong form,43 reflects all publicly
available information."
37. Loss causation requires "that the defendant's misrepresentation (or other fraudulent
conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff's economic loss." Dura, 544 U.S. at 346. Implicit in the
definition of a corrective disclosure is a causal link to the misrepresentation. Therefore, by showing
that the disclosure is the corrective disclosure, and that it moved the market, the plaintiff establishes
loss causation. See Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265, for a similar conclusion regarding market movement and
loss causation.
38. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342; Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that at any time before the corrective disclosure, "the cost of the alleged misrepresentation
is still incorporated into the value of the security and may be recovered at any time simply by resell-
ing the security at the inflated price").
39. The public misrepresentation defrauds purchasers of stock even if they did not specifi-
cally rely on the bad information. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988).
40. Id. at 245; accord Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, and
Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REv. 443, 455-58 (2006) (noting that fully efficient markets are
"not logically possible"). There is some dispute as to what Basic meant by continually referring to
the "integrity" of the market. The correspondence between Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun at
the time of the opinion suggests that Justice Blackmun thought that reliance on the integrity of the
market was necessary to establish the presumption-that is, "if there exists such a person who did
not rely on the integrity of the market price to be accurate, that person was not defrauded by the
misrepresentation" See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2008). Justice Brennan's understanding did not view this belief in integrity to be
necessary, and took the view that merely buying through the market was sufficient to establish the
presumption. See id.
41. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244.
42. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 ER.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
43. 4 HAZEN, supra note 15, § 12.10; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Fi-
nance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059,
1078-79 (1990).
44. Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1077. There are three efficiency hypotheses: weak,
semistrong, and strong. Weak form efficiency supposes that stock price is independent of past per-
formance because the market's valuation of the security already includes all historical information.
November 2009]
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Requiring loss causation to establish the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion, and by extension any of its elements, conflates loss causation and
reliance. Whether or not the market actually responded after the corrective
disclosure is not direct evidence of the mental state of the buyer at the timeS 45
of his purchase-the central inquiry of reliance. The remaining Sections in
this Part extend this analysis to the fraud-on-the-market elements of materi-
ality and efficient markets as well as the rebuttal, all of which have been
used by courts and commentators to place the loss causation burden on
plaintiffs at class certification and conclude that none of these rationales
supports imposing the loss causation requirement on plaintiffs at class certi-
fication.
1. Materiality and Loss Causation
Some courts and commentators require a plaintiff to show loss causa-
tion-type evidence to establish the materiality of the misrepresentation-anS46
element of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. The reasoning states that
for a misrepresentation to be material, there must be market movement after
either the misrepresentation or the disclosure, or both-possible antecedents
47
of loss causation.
The problem with this is that, unlike loss causation, materiality is an ex
ante standard. Materiality asks whether there is "a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider [the information] important.
' 48
Some courts, including the Third Circuit, have understood this to require
stock-price movement following the alleged corrective disclosure.49 This
view misconstrues materiality. Materiality, like reliance under the fraud-on-
the-market theory, asks what the reasonable investor would have done.
Stated differently, the court must place itself in the shoes of a reasonable
investor at the time of the misrepresentation, 5 rather than engaging in an
By contrast, strong form efficiency supposes that current market prices reflect all information, both
public and private; therefore, even insider traders cannot outperform the market. Id. at 1077-78.
45. Comell & Rutten, supra note 40, at 458-60; see infra Part H.
46. At least one commentator has suggested the materiality requirement as an alternate
means to justify the conclusion of Oscar. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 39-40. Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit opinions in Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001), and Greenberg v.
Crossroads Systems, Inc., 364 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2004), can be read as attempts by the Fifth Circuit
to impose a higher standard of materiality. Given that the cases came before Dura, however, they
could also be trying to impose some sort of loss causation pleading requirement.
47. See supra note 37.
48. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
49. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[I]f a company's disclosure of in-
formation has no effect on stock prices, 'it follows that the information disclosed ... was immaterial
as a matter of law.'" (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d
Cir. 1997))).
50. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Materiality is deter-
mined in light of the circumstances existing at the time the alleged misstatement occurred.").
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indirect empirical analysis of materiality based on hindsight and Color d by
intervening events.
5 '
The overwhelming weight of authority therefore recognizes that market
movement following a misrepresentation-while certainly probative and
perhaps even sufficient-is not necessary in determining materiality.52 Mar-
ket movement can merely help adduce what a reasonable investor would
have done, using the market as a proxy. It is by no means perfectly suited
for even this task, however, because the market may be moved by immate-
rial information53 or extrinsic distortions54 that would not induce the
reasonable person to deal. As a result, the prevailing standard for materiality
is a qualitative approach that considers both the type of information15 and
56the extent of the misrepresentation. Materiality can be shown independent
of market movement, and therefore the plaintiff should not bear the burden
of establishing this loss causation-type evidence at class certification.
2. Efficient Markets and Loss Causation
Another justification for requiring plaintiffs to show loss causation at
class certification is the efficient market element of the fraud-on-the-market
theory. Like materiality, market efficiency in its strictest form may be shown
through loss causation because, the reasoning goes, an efficient market
51. Spielman v. Gen. Host Corp., 402 E Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The determina-
tion of materiality is to be made upon all the facts as of the time of the transaction and not upon a
20-20 hindsight view long after the event." (emphasis added)), aff'd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. For example, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth circuits, as well as the SEC, espouse this
view. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 E3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding, post-
Oscar, that the concept of materiality in Basic does not require market movement and to require it
would "misread" Basic); Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 660-61 (4th Cir. 2004)
("The majority rule seems to be that [a stock price drop] can be some evidence, but not, standing
alone, dispositive evidence."); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am.
W. Holding Corp., 320 E3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64
Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (1999) ("Consideration of potential market reaction to disclosure of a
misstatement is by itself 'too blunt an instrument to be depended on' in considering whether a fact is
material."); see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 E2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[W]hether a
public company's stock price moves up or down or stays the same after the filing of a Schedule 13D
does not establish the materiality of the statements made, though stock movement is a factor the jury
may consider relevant.").
53. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 17, at 509-10 (explaining how immaterial information can
affect stock prices).
54. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund, 320 E3d at 934 ("Because
of the[] distortions [in 'efficient markets'], adoption of a bright-line rule assuming that the stock
price will instantly react would fail to address the realities of the market.").
55. See 4 HAZEN, supra note 15, § 12.9, for a list of different categories of information that
courts have deemed material.
56. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152. One commentator
has argued that the standard should instead focus on the length of the misrepresentation, rather than
the degree, because persistent misstatements are more likely to affect the market. James J. Park,
Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No.
109), available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 158566. In any case, this is a
general standard of materiality.
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would respond to material information." This highly individualized under-
standing of market efficiency is attractive in light of the heterogeneity of
market behavior across different types of information and securities." But
like materiality, market movement, and by extension loss causation, are not
the sine qua non of efficient markets under Basic.
Basic implicitly takes the view that an efficient market under the fraud-
on-the-market theory must be semistrong form efficient.5 9 Semistrong form
efficiency requires that the market absorb and reflect publicly available in-
formation. 60 Unfortunately, Basic does not specify means for making this
61
showing.
In defining efficiency, the approaches can be divided into two major
types: particular and general. The particularized approach requires a show-
ing that the market behaved efficiently in this instance-i.e., a strict "move
the market" type test. Provided the analysis focuses on both the misrepre-
sentation and disclosure (or market dissemination), this is equivalent to loss
62causation. Meanwhile, the general approach requires a showing that the
market is semistrong efficient as a whole. Within this general approach there
is one further level of abstraction. At its broadest, it may be sufficient to
show that the disputed security traded on a market-for instance, the New
York Stock Exchange-is efficient. At its most narrow, it may require a
court to establish that the market is semistrong efficient with respect to this
particular type of information or this particular security.
64
Basic demands only a general understanding of market efficiency. The
Court continually referred to an "open and developed" securities market in a
57. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir.
2007).
58. See id. (citing Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1083). For a commentator's take on the
same point, see, for example, Carol R. Goforth, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis-An In-
adequate Justification for the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 895
(1992).
59. Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1078. The Court did not apply either strong or weak-
form efficiency. Strong form efficiency would preclude a misrepresentation claim because the
market would know the truth regardless of the misrepresentations of the defendant. At the same
time, Basic explicitly went beyond weak form efficiency, which focuses only on past stock prices,
by noting that the market price of shares reflects all publicly available information-the definition
of semistrong form efficiency. Id.; see Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
60. Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1078. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 331-354 (8th ed. 2006) (describing the efficient markets hy-
pothesis and its most common anomalies).
61. Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[Basic] offers little
guidance for determining whether a market is efficient."). Courts have had a difficult time providing
a definition for an efficient market. Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the
Indicators of Common Stocks'Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 310 (1994) ("[D]etermination of effi-
ciency has to date been based on intuition, rules of thumb, or both.").
62. See supra Section I.A.
63. The Oscar court was particularly concerned with this type of efficiency. Oscar Private
Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,269-70 (5th Cir. 2007).
64. The Cammer test, discussed infra note 66, predominantly focuses on security-specific
factors. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989).
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general sense;" the majority of courts have developed a definition on the
6basis of this understanding. For instance, the First Circuit has adopted a
general approach that examines "the structure of the market and the speed
with which all publicly available information is impounded in [the] price"
within the market. 67
This is not to say that market movement is not probative in determining
68
whether a market is generally efficient. An ostensibly efficient market may,
in fact, be inefficient, or strong form efficient (i.e., the market is aware of
nonpublic information), across different types of information. 69 Notwith-
standing the potential for overlap with the materiality element, it could be
important to have a narrower scope of efficiency, with respect to the particu-
lar type of information and particular security, to establish market efficiency.
Yet this normative conclusion does not mandate a move-the-market test.
The market movement would be just one example of the particular secu-
rity's reaction to the particular information, which is not any more
meaningful in determining efficiency than any other instance where the se-
curity responded to this type of information. 70 Furthermore, overreliance on
market movement can lead to false positives. The market can incorporate
information, the sole purpose of the efficiency determination, without a
change in price. For example, where there is a simultaneous release of posi-
tive and negative information, the market may respond without a price
change. Also, an adherence to a bright line market test provides potential
defendants a means of evading subsequent liability through the use of coun-
tervailing statements-one true and one false, combined to eliminate market
movement-to conceal misrepresentations or disclosures. The best course is
therefore to permit a plaintiff to raise loss causation-type evidence to show
general market efficiency while understanding that it is not absolutely nec-
essary and better evidence may in fact exist.
65. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988).
66. The most common test, first announced in Cammer, 711 F Supp. at 1286-87, is a gen-
eral approach that looks at a number of factors characteristic of efficiency: (1) a large weekly
trading volume; (2) the existence of a significant number of reports by securities analysts; (3) the
existence of market makers and arbitrageurs in the security; (4) the eligibility of the company to file
an S-3 Registration Statement; and (5) a history of immediate movement of the stock price caused
by unexpected corporate events or financial releases.
67. In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 E3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005).
68. The case for market movement is stronger for materiality-but similarly unavailing-
which by its definition focuses on the specific type of information. See infra Section II.C.
69. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269-70 (5th Cir.
2007).
70. Like materiality, the specific instance may in fact be sufficient but not necessary to gen-
erally show efficiency because it would be the most probative example for factor five of the Cammer
test. See supra note 66.
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3. Fraud-on-the-Market Rebuttal and Loss Causation
The fraud-on-the-market rebuttal, which explicitly allows defendants to
introduce loss causation-type evidence at the class certification stage,7' does
not require the plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of loss causation to
utilize the presumption. Specifically, the rebuttal allows the defendant to
rebut the Basic presumption with "[a]ny showing that severs the link be-
tween the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid)
by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price.72 In a case
where there is no market movement after the misrepresentation, the rebuttal
could be as manifest as merely presenting this fact.7 3 Thus, some commenta-
tors have argued that this results in a loss causation-type burden for which
the plaintiff must present counterevidence. 4
First, this position assumes, without support, that Basic endorses the
bursting-bubble approach to presumptions. There are three possible ap-
proaches to presumptions. The first states that a presumption places both the
burden of persuasion and production to counter the presumed fact on the
opposing party. While this view still finds support among courts and com-
mentators," Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that a
presumption shifts only the burden of production and not the burden of per-. 76
suasion. The second alternative is the bursting-bubble approach, which
eliminates the presumption as soon as there is contrary evidence, requiring
some form of counterevidence to reestablish the once-presumed fact. 77 The
third is an "intermediate" approach, which allows the once-presumed fact to
71. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988).
72. Id. at 248.
73. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265 ("In Nathenson [v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001)],
the link was severed by publicly available information that the misrepresentation didn't move the
stock price."). It is worth noting at this point that market movement after the disclosure does not
rebut the presumption. This evidence bears on loss causation and only incidentally on reliance,
provided the defendant can show that the disclosure really was at the time when the market dissemi-
nated the information and no other changed circumstances accounted for the absence of a drop.
Interestingly, this would effectively require the defendant to show all the causal elements of loss
causation, but without a loss, to mount a rebuttal. See Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d
657, 666 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[P]laintiffs must demonstrate: (1) that the negative 'truthful' information
causing the decrease in price is related to an allegedly false, non-confirmatory positive statement
made earlier and (2) that it is more probable than not that it was this negative statement, and not
other unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant amount of the decline."). In other
words, loss causation provides the necessary link between the disclosure and the misrepresentation,
and this, by extension, allows reliance-or but-for causation, which is focused on the misrepresenta-
tion-to be refuted through the disclosure.
74. E.g., Jaime A. Levitt & Michael Gerard, Loss Causation at Class Certification: Illusory
Circuit Split, N.YL.J., Nov. 5, 2008, at para. 20.
75. Id. But see Oscar, 487 F.3d at 275 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Judge Dennis takes the posi-
tion that Basic also shifts the burden of persuasion. Id. Although neither the language of Basic nor
the Rules of Evidence explicitly supports this approach to presumptions, it does find support in the
scholarly literature. Applying the approach would make the Basic rebuttal even more incongruous
with a loss causation burden on plaintiffs.
76. FED. R. EvID. 301.
77. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 274 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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be found without any counterevidence." There is no indication that the Ba-
sic court intended to adopt the bursting-bubble approach. Even assuming
this much, an absence of market movement does not necessarily establish
the rebuttal by a preponderance of evidence. 9 So while the court may have
to ignore the presumed fact in the event of the market-movement rebuttal,
the court could still conclude that the balance of evidence supports the
fraud-on-the-market presumption.
Second, the counterevidence required to reestablish the presumed fact
after a rebuttal based on an absence of market movement is not tantamount
to loss causation. A showing of loss causation would be a sufficient response
to a successful rebuttal, but it is certainly not necessary. ° A plaintiff would
merely have to present some countervailing information or force that could
have been responsible for the nonmovement (rather than make an affirma-
tive case for loss causation), putting the defendant's rebuttal into doubt."
Therefore, while loss causation is probative with respect to its predicates of
materiality and efficient markets and its rebuttal, Basic does not require
plaintiffs to establish loss causation at class certification to benefit from the
fraud-on-the-market presumption. There is, however, another basis in Rule
23 for just such a requirement.
II. Loss CAUSATION AT THE CLASS CERTIFICATION STAGE
THROUGH THE CLASS DEFINITION
Loss causation must be shown by the plaintiff at class certification to de-
fine the class with the accuracy that Rule 23 demands. This Part shows that
both existing law and sound policy evince the requirement of a timely and
precise class definition, which can be shown only with loss causation. Sec-
tion II.A asserts that loss causation is an indispensable precursor to an
accurate class definition. Sections II.B and I.C demonstrate that modem
courts' practice of deferring the issue violates the Rule 23(b)(3) definiteness
requirement and contravenes the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's
("PSLRA") goal of deterring strike suits. Finally, Section II.D shows that
the early consideration of loss causation, generally, furthers social welfare.
78. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 71, at
1336-39 (2d ed. 1994).
79. See supra Sections I.B.1 & I.B.2.
80. As explained in note 73, supra, an absence of a price movement after a disclosure is not
in itself a rebuttal.
81. Alternatively, the plaintiff could abandon the fraud-on-the-market presumption and at-
tempt to prove actual reliance for some or all class members. Zlotnick v. TIE Commc'ns, 836 F.2d
818, 824 (3d Cir. 1988).
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A. The Class Period at Class Certification
According to Rule 23(c)(1)(B), "[a]n order that certifies a class action
must define the class., 82 Rule 10b-5 defines the affected class as all indi-
viduals who bought (or sold, depending on the nature of the
misrepresentation) the security on a date between the misrepresentation and
the corrective disclosure.83 The start date of the class, or the date of the mis-
representation, is usually easily ascertainable-it is the date of the purported
misrepresentation. The class then includes all purchasers of the security up
until the day of the corrective disclosure or, in the instances of multiple
disclosures, the final corrective disclosure. The class period therefore ends,
and liability under the securities laws terminates, when fully "curative in-
formation is publicly announced or otherwise effectively disseminated."85
While a class definition should generally not use terminology that de-
pends on resolving the merits,86 the lOb-5 class definition is inextricably
laden with fact analysis. The term "curative" presupposes that a court has
knowledge of which disclosures, if any, were corrective. Disclosures can
range from fully corrective to noncorrective, with a complete gradation in
between.
The class definition requires two separate analyses-the timing and ef-
fect of the alleged misrepresentation and the corrective disclosure(s)-that• 87
together compose loss causation. The effect of the misrepresentation is
germane because it marks the start of the class period and it identifies the
harm the disclosure must correct. 8 And the corrective disclosure determines
the end of the class period. The complexity of the loss causation analysis
will depend on the specifics of the case. In many instances, there will be a
perfectly symmetrical disclosure-i.e., a disclosure that is a direct refutation
of misrepresentation and reveals the truth-with no possible intervening
factors. Here, the loss causation showing should be trivial and the class pe-
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
83. Cf Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) ("[I]f, say, the purchaser
sells the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not
have led to any loss.").
84. See Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule lOb-5 Causes
of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 Bus. LAW. 163, 175-76
(2007).
85. In re Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-89-20351-RPA, 1990 WL 169140, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1990) (quoting In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., No. 655, 1987 WL 19343, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. July 7, 1987)).
86. Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 368 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
87. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. The definition of corrective disclosure assumes reflexivity
with the initial misrepresentation. It may take one of many forms, ranging from an outright state-
ment to a diffuse market dissemination of the truth. To understand the nature of this definition of
disclosure is to understand, if possible, exactly what "proximately caused the loss." See supra note
37 and accompanying text for further discussion on this identity.
88. In re SciMed Securities Litigation, No. 3-91-575, 1993 WL 616692 (D. Minn. Sept. 29,
1993), held that "commencement and termination dates for a class period and concomitant class
membership determinations can be resolved only by an inquiry to the merits of the suit." Id. at *7.
The court then concluded, however, that Eisen prohibited such an exercise. Id.
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riod should be easily defined.8s But in cases where the disclosures are sev-
eral or diffuse, the loss causation analysis, which identifies the corrective
disclosure or market dissemination, will be more involved. Without loss
causation, the court will have no idea which disclosures, if any, are correc-
tive and therefore cannot define the end of the class period. Because loss
causation defines the class, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
that a class satisfies Rule 23,90 the plaintiff must demonstrate loss causation
at class certification.
This type of merits analysis is permissible at the class certification stage.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin held that a court may not "conduct a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the merits" at class certification. 91 This, however, is a bar
only to considering the likelihood of success on the merits as a basis for
class certification.92 Class certification requires rigorous analysis and proof,
and courts should look beyond the mere pleadings to the factual evidence to
make certain the plaintiff has met the requirements of Rule 23, including the
class definition. 93 And modem courts uniformly apply an exacting standard
in assessing whether plaintiffs have met the Rule 23 requirements. 94
Nonetheless, the spirit of Eisen presents courts with a paradox. Either
they must sacrifice accuracy in the class definition or they must engage loss
causation more fully. Most courts have adopted the former approach.95 When
dealing with disclosures that are partial and several, courts often defer the
decision by setting the class end date to its latest possible point and making
89. But even in these instances, the corrective disclosure may actually turn out to be a market
dissemination of the truth in advance of the apparent disclosure.
90. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 457, 467 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
91. 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
92. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d
ed. 2005 & Supp. 2009).
93. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); In re Initial Pub. Offerings
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[Class certification] require[s] definitive assessment of
Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their overlap with merits issues." (emphasis added)), reh'g
denied, 483 E3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir.
2004); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2001); cf
Prof'l Adjusting Sys. of Am., Inc. v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (holding it acceptable, in a pre-2003 amendment context, to conduct "discovery directed at an
early stage of the litigation to the very purpose of defining the class or determining that it is too
amorphous for judicial handling"). The Fifth Circuit has warned, however, that a class certification
hearing should not digress into "mini-trials on the merits of the class or individual claims." Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005).
94. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008)
("[A] district court errs as a matter of law when it fails to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute
relevant to determining the requirements [of Rule 23]."); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance
Telecom Inc., 487 F3d 261,267-68 (5th Cir. 2007).
95. See, e.g., In re Boesky Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding a mere
determination of the "character or type" of the plaintiffs was necessary); Staffin v. Greenberg, No.
79-3157, 1980 WL 1404, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1980) ("It may well be that ... a number of class
members may be shown to have suffered no damage. That fact does not and should not, prevent the
court from certifying a class provided that the Rule 23 requirements are met." (quoting Tucker v.
Arthur Anderson, 67 F.R.D. 468, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1975))).
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adjustments as necessary when it undertakes the merits.96 This approach,
however, is irreconcilable with sound policy and congressional intent. In-
stead, courts must zealously undertake the class issue, not only to ensure
fairness in securities litigation, but to satisfy the definiteness and lead-
plaintiff requirements of Rule 23 and further the animating purpose of the
PSLRA to deter strike suits.
B. Requirements of Rule 23
Precision in the class period, which requires loss causation analysis, in-
heres in the definiteness requirement of Rule 23. 9' The purpose of an
adequate class definition is "to determine the scope of the class and the pro-
priety of permitting plaintiffs to represent ... it." 98 A class cannot be
"amorphous, vague, or indeterminate."99 While the determination of the ac-
tual number of individuals in a class is not essential at the class certification
stage, the definition must allow a court to determine, at any given time,
whether an individual is a member of the class.' °
To illustrate how amorphous a class definition can be under the current
popular regime, imagine a fact pattern similar to that of Dura101 Company A
distributes a false earnings statement. Over a period of months, the officials
of A make false statements regarding earnings (X) at To, and future products
(Y) at T, (both material). At T, A discloses that statement Y was false and
A's stock price decreases by 25 percent. At T3 A discloses that statement X
was false, leading to another 25 percent stock price decrease. To define the
class, the court would have to determine the date of the corrective disclo-
sure. Under these facts, plaintiffs would likely argue that the primary
corrective disclosure was T to enlarge the class, while defendants would
favor T2. If T2 and T are several months apart and A is a heavily traded stock
(as it would have to be to establish the fraud-on-the-market presumption), or
if there were no disclosures at T2 and T3 but a market correction nonetheless,
a very large number of plaintiffs would be uncertain of their membership in
the class. By deferring accurate class definitions to beyond the class certifi-
96. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) ("An order that grants or denies class certification may be
altered or amended before final judgment."); see also, e.g., In re Blech Sec. Litig., No. 94 Civ.
7696(RWS), 2003 WL 1610775, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003) (changing the class period to the
period in which plaintiff actually alleged damages); Gilbert v. First Alert, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 81 (N.D.
111. 1996).
97. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977) (listing
cases that state a definiteness requirement).
98. Vernon J. Rockler & Co., Inc. v. Graphic Enters., Inc., 52 ER.D. 335, 338 (D. Minn.
1971).
99. E.g., Mueller v. CBS, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 227, 233 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting In re Tetracy-
cline Cases, 107 ER.D. 719,728 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
100. Bzdawka v. Milwaukee County, 238 F.R.D. 469, 474 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Courts usually
make this determination on a case-by-case basis. E.g., Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1348
(4th Cir. 1976).
101. For further precision, see Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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cation stage and proceeding with vague and amorphous classes, courts are
violating this important precept of definiteness.
Beyond the general definiteness requirement, this uncertainty over the
end of the class period can raise concerns over the adequacy of the lead
plaintiff. For instance, if in the above hypothetical the lead plaintiff acted
between T, and T3, the court would be unable to determine whether the class
representative is adequate or representative because he may turn out not to
even be a member of the class. Furthermore, in this time, the lead plaintiff
could exacerbate agency costs by acting in an interested manner to advance
his interests at the expense of the class-e.g., by diminishing the causal ef-
fect of factors that may serve the majority of class members.
C. Economic Cost of Deferring the Class-Period Definition
An overbroad class will be sticky in the parties' perception of the ex-
pected judgment, and therefore inflate the expected settlement. This will
have two adverse effects: distorting the parties' settlement decision and en-
couraging negative-value suits. Congress's concern with negative-value
strike suits, coerced settlements, and opportunistic plaintiff's attorneys filing
lawsuits every time there was a stock price drop motivated the passage of
the PSLRA in 1995.'02
Deferring the class definition amplifies these threats by anchoring the
parties' expectations. In a securities class action, the expected judgment is a
function of the harm caused by the fraud and the number of plaintiffs. While
the court will resolve both these factors when it adjudicates the merits, the
class definition actually bounds the number of plaintiffs. Naturally, plaintiffs
will plead the greatest number of plaintiffs; and, similarly, courts have con-
sistently shown a preference to adopt the broadest possible class definition
at class certification. 0 3 By granting class certification on these classes, the
court places its imprimatur on the class definition,'t 4 and this definition will
anchor the parties' expected judgments. Therefore, both parties' expected
judgments at trial will be higher, and more accurate, after class certifica-• 05
tion. Even if the court were to inform the parties that, by not considering
102. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 4, at 1490 ("[T]he PSLRA reflected several core
assertions that had been part of the push for the legislation: plaintiffs' attorneys initiated and man-
aged securities class actions; attorneys had incentives to pursue claims that were not optimal for
corporations, shareholders, and the larger society; settlement was independent of the merits.").
103. See, e.g., In re Victor Techs. Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 53, 58 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 792
F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[S]hould the development of facts during the course of the litigation
prove otherwise, this court can always fashion appropriate relief at that time."); Weinberger v.
Thornton, 114 F.R.D. 599, 606 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("[T]his court must, at this stage of the proceedings,
accept the proposed time limits of the Class Period. They will be adjusted, if necessary, by the trier
of fact."). Courts will then amend the class period or introduce subclasses to ensure the requirements
of Rule 23 are met.
104. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1292 (2002) ("[T]he class obtains substantial settlement leverage from a favor-
able certification decision.").
105. See Bryant G. Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action, 62 IND. L.J.
497, 501-02 (1987) ("[T]he failure to win certification reduces the bargaining power of the plaintiff
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loss causation, the size of the class could very likely change, this effect
would persist.' °6 Because the decision to settle almost always occurs after
class certification,'v the parties will almost always be under the influence of
this bias when facing the settlement decision.' °s
This increased expected judgment will have two negative effects. First, it
will result in larger, skewed settlements, which effectuate an inefficient
wealth transfer from defendants to plaintiffs and distort the plaintiffs' deci-
sion to bring suit. If, instead, the court were to determine the true class size
at class certification, by examining loss causation, settlements after class
certification would be more efficient.
Second, this increased expected judgment will also increase the success
of harmful negative-value suits, or suits where the costs exceed the judg-
ment. Negative-value suits are socially undesirable in instances where they
derive from a low probability of success on the merits but a large possible
judgment ("bad type"); they are desirable, however, where there is a high
probability of success on the merits but a small possible judgment ("good
type").' '9 Securities class actions are more frequently of the bad type."" Be-
cause of the high costs of litigation-which increase the likelihood of
settlement'- and potentially enormous judgments-which trigger risk
aversion among defendants' 12-securities class actions are especially prone
to settlement, and this makes them an attractive choice for negative-value
suits.' 3 An accurate class definition will reduce the expected judgment after
and the will to continue the fight .... Class certification makes such a difference in the settlement
value of the case that defendants will not take plaintiffs' claims seriously until certification is
achieved.").
106. Studies have shown that even where the parties are experts or are informed of the poten-
tial framing effect, the effects of anchoring persist. Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing
Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1536
(2001). For background discussion on the effects of anchoring in the courtroom, as well as the phe-
nomenon in general, see id.
107. See Bone & Evans, supra note 104 ("[T]he vast majority of certified class actions settle,
most soon after certification."); Garth, supra note 105.
108. The timing of the class period decision should have no effect on the expected settlement
prior to the class certification stage. The probability of proving the affirmative case, which defines
the expected judgment, is constant regardless of the timing.
109. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 422-23 (2004).
110. See infra Section II.D for a discussion on why this is the case.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (noting that the PSLRA was an attempt to curb "the abuse of the discovery
process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to set-
tle"); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973).
112. Posner, supra note Ill, at 418-19.
113. First, the potential judgments are exponentially large compared to the typical civil suits.
Risk aversion has commonly been used as a justification for the frequency of settlement in securities
class actions and the oft-noted irrelevance of the merits. Unsurprisingly, studies show that the great-
er the risk-i.e., the judgment-the greater the aversion-i.e., the desire to settle. Second, the costs
of litigation are very high. The higher the costs of litigation, the greater the range of possible settle-
ment values. See id. Because the cost of taking a securities suit to trial can be in the millions and
span several years, it is more likely that the parties' respective expectations of prevailing (taking into
[Vol. 108:255
Loss Causation and Class Certification
class certification, the time when most parties settle. This will lessen the
effects of risk aversion on the decisionmaking of defendants, as well as
lessen the costs of trial, and will therefore make plaintiffs less likely to settle
negative-value suits at this stage. The reduced likelihood of settlement will
diminish the likelihood that these suits will be brought, which will produce
a net societal benefit."
4
D. The Added Benefits and Reduced Costs of Early
Loss Causation Consideration
This Section contemplates the ancillary effects of considering loss cau-
sation to form precise class definitions at the certification stage and shows
that the benefits far outweigh the costs.
Moving loss causation to class certification increases the likelihood that
the merits will be heard at all, which, in turn, will reduce the prevalence of
negative-value strike suits. Congress has a long-stated interest in making the
merits matter more in securities litigation."5 The stronger the case for loss
causation, the more likely the plaintiff will be able to extract a pre-class
certification settlement. 16 Next, because settlement occurs most frequently
after class certification, and attaining class certification requires a stronger
claim on the merits, the parties will be settling claims that are more likely to
be meritorious."7 This additional hurdle eliminates more of the bad-type
negative-value strike suits because they, by definition, have a low probabil-
ity of success on the merits, including loss causation. Considering loss
causation at class certification thus makes the merits matter sooner and
account an optimism bias) will fail to overcome this range. This intrinsic high likelihood of settle-
ment makes it more advantageous for plaintiffs to seek negative-value suits-suits with an expected
value of less than zero at the outset. See Bone & Evans, supra note 104, at 1294-95, 1298 ("[F]irst,
the class action magnifies the stakes through aggregation; second, it increases the defendant's risk-
bearing, litigation, and reputation costs .... [C]orporate defendants tend to be risk-neutral, but they
are likely to become more risk-averse as the potential class-wide liability represents a larger fraction
of corporate assets.").
114. At the time of the PSLRA, some commentators expressed concern that the heightened
pleading standards, an arguably analogous modification to the one at issue in this Note, would im-
pose a societal cost because the increase in false negatives would outweigh the decrease in false
positives. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type I! Error and the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 711 (1996).
115. For a discussion concluding that Congress has succeeded in this intent to some extent
thus far, see Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 627 (2007).
116. Increased expected trial costs for the defendant mean a greater likelihood of settlement.
When the loss causation case is strong, requiring the plaintiff to prove it at class certification will
not reduce his probability of attaining class certification (which makes the defendant less likely to
settle) sufficiently to offset the increased cost of class certification.
117. Because class certification requires the parties to prove loss causation, those cases that
make it past this point will be more likely to prevail at trial. This increases the expected judgment
after class certification. It is worth noting that, again, the expected judgment before class certifica-
tion will not change.
November 2009]
Michigan Law Review
more. This is a socially desirable outcome and furthers the purpose of the
PSLRA."'
There will, however, be some costs associated with this increased scru-
tiny prior to trial." 9 It is possible that the rule may deter the good-type
negative value suit-i.e., those where the likelihood of success on the merits
is high but the expected judgment is low. Meritorious suits will face in-
creased difficulty and cost to reach a stage where they are likely to settle.
Three factors mitigate this effect, however. First, as stated earlier, very few
securities class actions are actually good-type suits. Because of risk aver-
sion, bad-type suits have higher expected payouts and therefore plaintiffs'
lawyers are more like to pursue them. Good-type suits are less attractive to
plaintiffs as the defendant is more likely to call the plaintiff's bluff-i.e., his
noncredible threat to go to trial-because the smaller potential judgments
are less likely to trigger the defendant's risk-averse tendency to settle. Sec-
ond, because the parties' expected costs at the outset will increase, the
likelihood of a pre-class certification settlement will also increase.12 Third,
proving loss causation and attaining class certification-a trivial hurdle in
good-type cases because of their strength on the merits-will increase the
expected settlement value of these cases.12 So while good-type negative
value cases may be slightly more expensive to bring, they are already very
infrequent in the lOb-5 context and may now settle more frequently before
certification and at higher amounts after certification, offsetting the costs.
The other potential concern is the prejudice, or error cost, that could re-
sult without the procedural safeguards of trial. Trial offers a lengthier period
for discovery, closer scrutiny by the trier of fact, and procedural safeguards
that are unavailable at class certification. 112 Therefore, the likelihood of an
error in the loss causation determination would theoretically decrease.
In fact, loss causation at class certification would have minimal error
costs. As an initial matter, considering loss causation at the class certifica-
tion stage does not bind the trial court in any manner.12 Therefore, the risk is
limited to the cost of an incorrect determination in the time between class
118. For a discussion of the motivations behind the PSLRA and how it has changed securities
class actions, see Choi & Thompson, supra note 4.
119. These fears were noted by many as a byproduct of the PSLRA. See, e.g., Stephen J.
Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. EcON.
& ORG. 598 (2007); Stout, supra note 114. There could be a similar effect here. A fundamental
difference between a heightened standard at class certification rather than a motion to dismiss-
which Professor Choi's paper addresses-is that the former allows more substantive discovery and
careful examination and therefore courts are less likely to be influenced by superficial factors such
as the "hard evidence" of a concurrent SEC investigation.
120. An increase in the expected costs of litigation makes settlement more likely. See Posner,
supra note 111, at 417-20.
121. See supra note 117.
122. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). This is true despite the fact
that class certification decisions can be appealed under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
123. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[D]etermination
as to a Rule 23 requirement is made only for purposes of class certification and is not binding on the
trier of facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge.").
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certification and trial. There have been changes in the law that should limit
this cost. Under Rule 23, courts historically made the class certification de-
cision "as soon as practicable,"'2 4 but there has been a recent push, both in
law and practice, toward later certification hearings. 21 In 2003, Congress
amended Rule 23 to allow a ruling "at an early practicable time."' 2 6 The Ad-
visory Committee's note to the amendment states that "[a] court that is not
satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certi-
fication until they have been met."'' 7 This development allows judges to
control both the timing-to allow further discovery-and nature-to allow
closer scrutiny--of the class certification hearing, which should minimize
the cost of incorrect determinations. In addition, district court judges are
familiar and competent with pretrial hearings. For instance, judges in
Markman hearings for claim construction in patent law make similar, but
binding, merits adjudications early in a case."' There is therefore no reason
to expect a substantial diminution in the quality of the loss causation deter-
mination.
In sum, many commentators have presumed that the general effect of
considering loss causation at the class certification stage will be to harm
plaintiffs. 2 9 But taking away the class definition inaccuracy, plaintiffs will
have the same expected judgment (and therefore settlement value) before
trial and a higher expected judgment after class certification, when most
class actions settle. And while perhaps fewer total claims will reach this
stage, the meritorious ones should clear the class certification hurdle and
attain these greater settlements. Therefore, it is only the meritless strike suit
that will lose value-a welfare-maximizing outcome.
CONCLUSION
Loss causation is at the crux of the class definition, an outcome determi-
nant in securities class actions. Courts and commentators have long
endorsed the confluence of loss causation and class certification but, while
often bearing the right instincts, have struggled to find a convincing justifi-
cation. Existing explanations mistakenly focus on the fraud-on-the-market
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (1998) (amended 2003).
125. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir.
2007).
126. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) advisory committee's note to 2003 Amendment.
128. See generally Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and Judicial
Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93 (2005) (discussing the timing and procedural ramifica-
tions of Markman hearings).
129. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 29, at 1100 ("By increasing the standard for materiality,
shifting the rebuttable presumption in favor of plaintiffs to a burden they must bear, and moving this
determination to the class certification stage, the logical conclusion is that the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing will make it much more difficult for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud to succeed in lOb-5
litigation.") (emphasis added); Recent Case, supra note 29, at 896 ("Requiring loss causation at the
certification stage reduces the likelihood that such attorneys can extract a quick settlement by alleg-
ing loss causation even though the case is unlikely to prevail at trial.").
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presumption for reliance and its predicates, efficient markets and materiality
and its rebuttal-which while nebulous in certain regards, do not require
market movement. Instead, plaintiffs must show loss causation at class certi-
fication because loss causation is necessary to define the class with the
precision demanded by Rule 23 and the PSLRA. To do any less would bur-
den the efficiency and substance of the fraud provisions of the Securities
Act.
